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The system of agricultural cooperatives in Japan is called JA.
1  This name comes from the 
combination of “Japan” and “Agriculture.”  JA plays a pivotal role in Japan’s agricultural 
sector.  JA holds an influential position in political dynamics and a strong economic power in 
rural areas.   
JA has a hierarchical, nationwide network and organizes a large majority of farmers.  
Based on its strong ties with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which has been in power 
for almost the entire postwar period, JA has been putting great pressure on the government to 
protect farmers’ interests. 
  JA is a mammoth economic entity.  JA provides various kinds of services, not only to 
farm households,  but also to  non-farm households.  JA has supermarkets to sell daily 
necessities to farm and non-farm households.  In addition, JA is active in collecting deposits 
from and selling insurance policies to them.  These banking and insurance businesses earn a 
major portion of JA’s profit.  Based on the profits from the banking and insurance businesses, 
JA forms farmers into a solid voting group.  
  Up until the early 1990s, the profititability of JA’s banking and insurance businesses 
had been stable because of the government’s heavy intervention policies in financial markets.  
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keito (its literal meaning is ‘system’).  For simplicity, this paper uses JA for the entire postwar period.    2
However, the government abandoned most of these interventions and introduced fierce 
competition to financial markets in the early 1990s.  This deregulation policy seriously 
undermined the profititabilty of JA’s banking and insurance businesses.  The mid-1990s can 
be  regarded as the turning point of the political dynamics of Japan’s agricultural sector.  
Since then, JA has been losing its economic power and therefore its organizing ability.  As a 
result, the political pressure for agricultural protection also has been weakening  
  In spite of its importance, information on JA’s banking and insurance businesses has 
been limited for foreign researchers.  This is probably because the JA system is so unique and 
complicated.  The purpose of this paper is to provide a clear understanding of JA’s activities 
and to explain  the  political dynamics in Japan’s agricultural sector. Following this 
introduction, Section 2 discusses the system and characteristics of JA.  Further details of JA’s 
banking and insurance businesses are explained in Section 3.  Section 4 reviews how 
financial liberalization damaged JA.  Section 5 offers a conclusion. 
 
2. Overview of the JA System 
 
The basic structure of the JA system was established in the mid-1950s.  JA had maintained a 
simple three-tier structure till 1997.  Unit cooperatives in the villages, towns and cities make 
up the first level.  Each unit cooperatives has its own jurisdiction which does not overlap with 
those of others.  Unit cooperatives provide not only agricultural services but also almost 
every service related to daily life.  Farmers are regular members of unit cooperatives and non-
farm residents can join as associate members if they express sympathy with the principles of 
the JA movement.  Both regular and associate members can use all the services of unit   3
cooperatives, but only regular members are entitled to commit the management of unit 
cooperatives.
2  The election for the president of a unit cooperative is also only among regular 
members.  
Above the unit cooperatives are agricultural federations.  Federations had formed two 
tiers at the prefectural and national levels till 1997.  Since then, JA has been restructuring 
these federations by merging prefectural-level federations into national-level federations.  
Among various types of agricultural federation, credit  federations and mutual  insurance 
federations  and economic federations are particularly important.  They support unit 
cooperatives’ banking and insurance activities.  All the federations and unit cooperatives 
belong to and are supervised by the National Central Union.  The National Central Union also 
organizes JA’s political activities. 
JA also functions as a de facto sub-governmental body of the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF).  Many MAFF policies would not have been executed without 
JA’s assistance.  A typical example is the acreage control program, the rice production cartel 
led by the MAFF, which continued 35 years from 1969 to 2003.  Under this program, the 
MAFF first set the national target for the acreage that should be diverted from rice planting, 
and allocated this target among the cities, towns and villages.  In both setting and allocating 
the target, the MAFF considered JA’s opinion.  JA monitored whether member farmers 
accomplish the allocated target acreage.   
The government provides various vested interests on JA’s economic activities, which 
should be regarded as ‘reward’ to JA’s functioning as a de facto sub-governmental body.  In 
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particular, the Ministry of Finance’s (MOF) favorable treatments on JA’s banking and 
insurance activities ensured stable profits to JA, as will be discussed to detail in the next 
section.     
JA has still kept a dominant position in the market shares in the distribution of farm 
products and supply of farm inputs.
3  This is because JA’s farming-support services are so 
wide and convenient for small-scale farmers, who retain farmland with the expectation of 
future capital gains but not so enthusiastic about making profits from farming.  Although 
entrepreneurial large-scale farmers make efforts to develop their own channels of farm 
product distribution and farm input procurement, the traditional small-scale farmers, who are 
still in the majority, have become more and more dependent on JA’s services. 
  The collusion among farmers (in particular, small-scale farmers),  politicians,  the 
MAFF and JA has helped maintain farmers’ income level.  While the average income of farm 
households fell behind that of urban households in the 1950s, the gap rapidly diminished in 
the 1960s.  From the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, farmers’ income level constantly exceeded 
their urban counterpart by nearly 15 percent.   
 
3. JA’s Financial Activities  
 
Japanese financial institutions were often compared to ‘armed convoys’ up till the early 
1990s.
4  This is because the MOF’s regulations and protections were so heavy.  For example, 
the MOF’s permission was needed for such activities as the location of branches and creation 
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of new financial instruments.  Moreover, interest rates of deposits and premiums of insurance 
were controlled at below-market levels.  Since the entry of new financial institutions was 
restricted, stable profits were ensured for existing financial institutions.   
The MOF provided particularly favorable treatments on JA’s financial activities.  For 
example, The MOF allowed JA greater freedom to set insurance premiums, which means a 
clear advantage over private insurance companies. JA was given more freedom than ordinary 
commercial banks to set up branches.  JA’s term-deposit interest rates were allowed to be 0.1 
percent higher than the rate set by the ordinary commercial banks.  Because of these heavy 
interventions by the MOF, JA’s federations for banking and insurance businesses could build 
up profits simply by  lending through the inter-bank money market to city banks which 
chronically faced a huge financial demand from large enterprises.   
  Unit cooperatives themselves have little ability to manage funds – they consign these 
operations to the upper federations.  Most of deposits collected by unit cooperatives are 
redeposited into the upper federations.  The profit margin between the redeposit and deposit 
interest rates was high until the early 1990s
5.  Unit cooperatives also obtained stable profits 
from commission charges by placing insurance funds into the upper federations. 
  The presidents of unit cooperatives, who are respectful keypersons in rural 
communities, are better politicians than businesspeople.  However, lack of business 
experience was no great barrier thanks to the privileges of banking and insurance businesses.  
The president simply set a target amount of deposits and insurance policies, towards which 
all the employees work.  Then, using JA’s organizational power, JA employees persuade 
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farmers to put more money on JA’s banking and insurance accounts.  A typical example of 
such efforts is the ‘deposit promotion week,’ when JA employees visit farmers after regular 
office hours and on weekends to ask for new deposits, appealing to a sense of obligation in 
their rural communities.  
Unit cooperatives became more and more dependent on the profits from banking and 
insurance in the 1970s and 1980s.  Ironically, these two decades were when unit cooperatives 
expanded the scope of their activities under the slogan of ‘not only farming but also rural 
living overall’.  Unit cooperatives started up various new businesses such as housing 
development and travel ticket services in the 1970s and 1980s, but these new businesses were 
not particularly profitable.  However, because unit cooperatives were providing a wider 
variety of services and offered greater convenience, they became more attractive to farmers.  
This helped unit cooperatives attract new deposits and sell new insurance policies.  In other 
words, the real purpose of these new activities was the promotion of JA’s financial services. 
  Because the president of a unit cooperative is elected by a  majority of regular 
members, JA policies favor the larger body of traditional, small-scale farmers rather than the 
smaller number of innovative, entrepreneurial farmers.  Farmers find it difficult not to rely on 
JA’s services because JA’s scope of business is so wide.  Even those who are critical of JA 
do not like to defy the organization for fear of retaliation from JA and other farmers.  The 
only resistance they can make is to reduce their reliance on the organization. 
 
4. Financial Liberalization and JA 
   7
The financial liberalization in Japan has proceeded gradually since 1979 when the MOF 
liberalized interest rates on large deposit accounts of over 100 million yen. However, the 
speed of liberalization was so slow that the business conditions of JA’s financial activities 
were relatively stable throughout the 1980s. 
However, the MOF’s liberalization of interest rates on small deposit accounts, which 
began in 1989 and was completed in 1994, threw JA into severe market competition with 
other financial institutes.  In addition, the MOF removed various regulations and protections 
to introduce fierce competition in the banking and insurance businesses in the 1990s. This 
sequence of the MOF’s financial liberalization eliminated various privileges from JA.  JA’s 
profitability in banking and insurance business fell drastically in the mid-1990s and has never 
recovered since then.  The presidents of unit cooperatives no longer were able to count on 
stable profits from their financial businesses.   
JA has been coping with this harsher business environment in three ways.  First, JA 
started  to reduce its staff.  Second, JA started merging prefectural-level federations with 
national-level federations, aiming to change the former three-layer structure into a two-layer 
structure.
6  Third, in order to seize the economy of scale, the consolidation of smaller unit 
cooperatives also sped up.
7  
  In spite of these countermeasures, JA could not avoid weakening its economic power.  
While the profitability of the financial businesses has been decreasing, JA still relies on 
profits from the financial businesses because profitability of JA’s other businesses is still low.  
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This means that JA’s economic position is now like ‘trading on thin ice.’  Since financial 
liberalization will irreversibly go on, JA’s more drastic restructuring will be also inevitable.   
  As a result of the descent of JA’s economic power, its organizing ability as well as 
voting power became less strong.  Since the mid-1990s, it has become not rare that JA suffers 
unexpected defeats in election.  A typical example is the 2004 upper house election: while the 
representatives from JA had constantly kept two sheets as proportional representation till the 
previous 2001 upper house election, they won no sheets then.   
  Since JA has played a pivotal role in the political dynamics in agricultural policies, 
JA’s losing power brings significant  changes in MAFF’s policy making.  The cozy 
relationship among farmers, politicians, the MAFF and JA is slowly but steadily decaying.  
For example, the MAFF is now considering abolishing the acreage control program, whereby 
the MAFF and JA have collaborated so as to support small-scale rice farmers.   The MAFF’s 
resistance against agricultural trade liberalization is also becoming less strong.
8   
The mid-1990s can be seen as the turning point of the political dynamics in the 
Japanese agricultural sector.
9  Since small-scale farmers have reduced their political power, it 
is now a prime occasion for the Japanese government to cease the long-lasting supports for 
small-scale farmers and promote innovative, large-scale farmers.  By doing so, international 
competitive power of Japan’s agriculture will be drastically strengthened.
10   
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In the international trade negotiations in the 1980s and 1990s, the Japanese government 
repeatedly showed strong resistance to liberalization of agricultural market.  This stubborn 
attitude exposed Japan to risk of failing to join the Final Agreements of the Uruguay Round.   
The government's strong resistance was backed by JA which represented the small-scale 
farmers’ benefits only.  Since JA had been one of the most influential voting groups, the 
government could not neglect strong claims from JA.   
However, as shown above, financial liberalization undermined JA’s income resources. 
Losing its economic power, JA has been decreasing its organizing ability as a voting group 
since the mid-1990s.  Because of this decrease in political pressure, there is now a prime 
opportunity for the Japanese government to reform its agricultural policies.  On the surface, 
the Japanese government is still against the trade liberalization on agricultural products in the 
current WTO negotiations.  In practice, the government is less likely to make such stubborn 
resistance as it made in the previous Rounds of international trade negotiations. 
Noticeably, it is not agricultural market and/or trade liberalization that is providing 
the  opportunity to undergo a fundamental reformation of agricultural policies.  Instead, 
financial liberalization is providing this opportunity.  Financial liberalization referred to all 
the financial institutes inclusively and was supported by the general consensus.  Thus, JA 
could not resist when the MOF abandoned its favorable treatments on JA as a part of 
financial liberalization.  Financial liberalization may not have direct impacts on agricultural 
policies.  But, through damaging JA’s economic power like a “body blow,” financial   10 
liberalization is gradually  but  mightily  inducing the Japanese government to renounce 
traditional agricultural protectionism. 
    
References 
 
Godo, Yoshihisa (2001) ‘The Changing Economic Performance and Political Significance of 
 Japan’s Agricultural Cooperatives’ Pacific Research Paper 318, Canberra: Australia- 
Japan Research Centre, pp. 1-31, August. 
Honma, Masayoshi (2003) ‘The Role of Agricultural Exports Reconsidered: A Case of Three 
 Southeast Asian Countries,’ in Hiroshi Kohama (ed.), External Factors for Asian 
 Development, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, pp.169-210. 
Japan Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), (1992) ‘Atarashi Shokuryo 
 Nogyo Noson Seisaku no Hoko’ (New Direction of Japan’s Agricultural Policy).   
Mulgan, Aurelia George (2000) The Politics of Agriculture in Japan, London and New York: 
 Loutledge. 
Teranishi, Juro (1994) ‘Japan: Development and Structural Change of the Financial System’, 
 in Hugh T. Patrick and Yung Chul Park (eds) The Financial Development of Japan, 
 Korea and Taiwan, New York: Oxford University Press. 